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B R I D G E WAT E R  S TAT E  C O L L E G E
Brad Vezina is a senior English major from 
Berkley, MA.  He wrote this piece in Dr. 
Aeon Skoble’s Aristotle and Plato class in 
Fall 00.       
“To say that Forms are patterns and that other things participate in them is empty 
talk, mere poetic metaphors.”
Aristotle – Metaphysics.
As a staunch empiricist and systematic thinker, Aristotle found little appeal in Plato’s theory of Forms.  Proponents of this theory argued that all material objects are based on universal, immutable concepts called Forms and that for a thing to exist it must share or participate 
in these Forms.  Ultimately, this theory holds that knowledge cannot be derived 
though our perception of sensible things, but only though our contemplation of 
the Forms, a position contrary to Aristotle’s.  Instead, Aristotle argues that reality 
is not dependent on universal abstracts (Forms), but on particular substances of 
physical things.  As such, Aristotle holds that we can ground our beliefs in the 
sensible world with some assurance.                         
At the heart of Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms is the idea that 
universals are not separate from particulars.  Platonists argue that each material 
object has its own corresponding Form(s), which is not embodied in the object 
itself, but separate from it.  For example, things are said to be beautiful in so 
much as they participate in the Form of Beauty, which is detached from the 
sensible world.  So a woman is beautiful in so much as she reflects the Form of 
Beauty, not in that she embodies the Form of beauty.  In this case, a particular 
(the woman) shares in a separate, detached universal (the Form), as opposed to 
the Form of Beauty being an inherent or intrinsic quality of the woman.     
 
Aristotle refutes this separation of universals from particulars in two simple 
ways: first, he argues that Forms cannot constitute a substance; and, secondly, 
that since Forms are not substances, Forms cannot cause a substance’s coming 
into being.  While Platonists hold that Forms are detached, non-physical entities 
that underlie—and cause—physical things, Aristotle is quick to point out the 
impossibility of such a claim:  “It would seem impossible for a substance to 
be separate from what it is the substance of.  How, then, if the Forms are the 
substances of things, could they be separate from them” (Metaphysics 991b). 
How is it, Aristotle is asking, that a non-substance (the Forms) can affect the 
qualities of a substance (the object of a Form)?       
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He addresses the impossibility of this problem in Book II of 
the Physics by introducing four causes responsible for a things 
change: the material, formal, efficient, and final cause.  Of these 
four causes, the Platonic Forms fails to explain two—that is, 
the material cause and the efficient cause.  Aristotle defines the 
efficient cause as the “source of the primary principle of change or 
stability” (194b30).  Because the Forms are non-substances, it is 
impossible, according to Aristotle, for a physical object’s substance 
to be primarily determined by its Form, especially considering 
that a Form is nothing more than a universal concept.  And since 
an object’s Form is a non-material, it would seem impossible for 
it to be the efficient cause of the object, simply for the reason that, 
as a non-material, no physical causation is possible. 
Aristotle also points out that if Forms underlie and cause all 
physical objects, then even the most odd and remote object will 
have its own form.  “[S]ome [Proofs] yield Forms of things that 
we think have no Forms,” he states (Metaphysics 990b10) as an 
example.  It would certainly be a stretch to conceive that dust 
and lint have their own Forms.  If this were so, then the Theory 
of Forms would designate Forms to the most trifling and minute 
objects that, to us, would seem ridiculous.  And for this reason, 
Aristotle felt that such a theory did not provide insight into and 
knowledge about the physical world.    
Instead, Aristotle proposes the idea that universal concepts are 
not separate from particular things, but merely commonalities 
shared by objects.  Take two yellow flowers, a marigold and a 
buttercup, for example.  According to a Platonist, the yellow 
marigold and buttercup exist and are yellow because they both 
share in the Form of Yellow.  Yet it would seem that both flowers’ 
color and existence are caused by several Forms: the Form of 
Yellow, Flower, and Yellow Flower.  And for Aristotle, this mingling 
and sharing of numerous Forms seems implausible and empty. 
Instead, Aristotle believes that the marigold and buttercup’s color 
is not caused by a detached Form, but that their color is simply 
a shared quality among the two flowers.  The universal is not 
separate from a particular but inherent in it.      
          
Indeed, the cornerstone of Aristotle’s ontology is his theory 
that reality is based on the substances of physical objects, not 
Forms.  “‘What is being?’ is just the question ‘What is substance?’” 
Aristotle states in the Metaphysics (1028b5).  Aristotle conceives 
that our understanding of what is real is simply a matter of 
understanding the relationship between particular substances 
and their universal qualities.  Of course, the question raised here 
is what does Aristotle mean by substance?  He offers an account 
of what a substance is in Book V of the Metaphysics: “Substance 
is spoken of in two ways.  It is both the ultimate subject, which 
is no longer said of anything else, and whatever, being a this, is 
also separable” (1017b25).  A substance, then, is individual and 
particular, which is not predicated of other things, but other 
things are predicated of it.
To understand what Aristotle means by substances being 
particulars that are subject to predication, we turn to the 
Categories.  Here Aristotle offers ten classes of being such as 
quantity, quality, where, and relative to name a few.  In essence, 
Aristotle is showing that there are many ways of being.  For 
instance, things are often said to be of a certain color, shape, size, 
or in a certain location.  But of the ten classes offered, the thing 
being predicated on, the substance, takes priority.  This is crucial 
in that, while there are many ways of being (more than the ten 
offered by in the Categories), Aristotle is arguing that all classes 
of being are in some way dependent on substance—that is, that 
universal predications are dependent on particular substances.
For example, let us return to the yellow marigold and buttercup.  Of 
the qualities shared by these flowers is the color yellow (i.e. yellow 
is predicated on both).  By describing the marigold and buttercup 
as yellow, we are making reference to their substance.  A thing—a 
substance—must exist in order for it to be called yellow, just as 
person must exist before we describe him as healthy.  Instead of 
attributing a particular’s (each flower) existence to the universal’s 
(the color Yellow), a view held by Platonists, Aristotle maintains 
the opposite: that particulars are the bases of reality and share 
universal commonalities, that universals depend on particular 
substances.  At the heart of this argument is that substance is 
a primary principle of being, whereas universal predications are 
merely secondary. 
Furthermore, like Plato, Aristotle understood that all physical 
substances are continually in motion and changing.  In Book I of 
the Physics, Aristotle explains that objects can change through 
many ways, such as addition, subtraction, or alteration, and 
that each change can be attributed to four specific causes (as I 
mentioned earlier).  For example, a once solid and strong log can 
be made hollow and soft by insects.  In this instance, a log passes 
from one state to another.  What Aristotle is concerned with here 
is the element which persists throughout the change, which is 
the substance, “the things that are without qualification” (190b). 
Therefore particulars, that is, substances, also consist of form and 
stuff.  A ball of clay, for instance, can be molded continuously but 
the clay itself, the substance, persists throughout.  
On the other hand, Aristotle is quick to point out in the Physics 
and Metaphysics that in order for a substance to change it must 
have the potential to do so.  Things can only change in so far as 
they are changeable.  For example, as human beings we can use 
our reasoning faculties to find happiness and flourish in life in so 
far as we are potentially reasonable.  Indeed, the main goal for us 
as human beings—and most other living things such as plants and 
animals—according to Aristotle, is to actualize our potentials.  In 
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this way, particulars are continually changing in accordance with 
the potentials inherent in them.  
However, unlike Plato, Aristotle holds this constant change of 
objects in the physical world as a movement towards a more 
perfected end goal.  Plato maintained that particular things 
continually change in so far as things may deform or degrade 
and, thus, are unreliable to our senses.  It is the universal Form of 
these physical objects that offers reliability.  On the other hand, 
Aristotle dismisses this.  Aristotle believes that substances or 
particulars do not suffer a continual degradation, but go through 
a process of perfection in that each living thing strives to actualize 
its potentials.  Thus, life becomes a process of actualization and 
perfection instead of degradation and corruption.
Although both Plato and Aristotle claim that there is an objective 
reality underpinning the physical world and that the world is 
knowable, Aristotle’s ontology offers a more pragmatic and 
plausible theory in that he grounds his epistemology, theory of 
knowledge, in the physical world.  Knowledge of what is real, 
according to Plato, is conferred by the Forms.  But what are the 
Forms?  Plato claims that they are immutable, universal concepts 
that underpin all objects, yet no one can prove their existence 
– not even Plato.  In this way, Plato’s theory becomes mystical and 
faith-based (Indeed at the heart of Plato’s Metaphysical theory 
is that the soul is immortal, a belief that cannot be proven nor 
disproved).
Aristotle, on the other hand, grounds reality on the sensible 
world, stating that reality is based on individual (particular) 
substances.  In this way, an understanding of what is real can 
be attained through the observation and testing of individual 
things—that is, the reality of things can be scientifically explored. 
This, of course, seems more appealing in that our beliefs, being 
grounded on physical objects, hold some truth.  It is also more 
appealing and plausible in that Aristotle epistemology through 
particulars is accessible by all people not just a few.  Plato held that 
only a few people could understand the Forms using dialectics 
and mathematics.  The few who are able grasp the Forms, the 
philosophers, were obligated to help enlighten their fellow 
contemporaries, a belief he introduces through the Allegory of 
The Cave.  Aristotle, in contrast, believes that all people can find 
truth through merely observing and understanding particular 
objects.  
In conclusion, given Aristotle’s empirical nature, it is not 
surprising that he rejects Plato’s Theory of Forms.  The notion that 
reality cannot be found through the perception of particulars in 
the sensible world certainly draw Aristotle’s criticism, especially 
considering that such a theory could not be substantiated.  That 
all particulars (substances) were dependent on universal concepts 
(Forms) Aristotle quickly deemed as mystical conjecture. 
Instead, Aristotle maintains that reality is based on particulars, 
on individual substances, which share universal commonalities. 
Aristotle places understanding and knowledge as objects that can 
be attained through our empirical observations of the physical 
realm.  Ultimately, he offers a systematic ontology than can be 
substantiated with physical evidence, with particulars. 
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